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A  dream  came  true.  Ten  years 
ago, Robert Schuman’s vision of a 
peaceful,  integrated  Europe, 
recognizing  its  common  history, 
was  finalized  with  the 
implementation of the euro. This 
achievement has lived for 10 years 
now, and  is  assuredly  a  success. 
But  the  euro  area  members 
continue to face the challenges of 
adjusting  to  the  single  monetary 
policy,  abiding  by  the  Stability 
and  Growth  Pact  on  the  fiscal 
side,  and  implementing  needed 
structural  reforms.  Europe  is 
closer than ever, but is still a work 
in  progress.  Europe  is  not  yet 
fully  integrated.  There  are  many 
and maybe too many chapters in 
the European story: the European 
Union  and  the  Economic  and 
Monetary Union to cite only two. 
In this report, the first ten years 
will be reviewed, successes will be 
highlighted,  and  challenges  will 
be  emphasized.  In  conclusion, 
the next ten years will be analyzed 
considering  the  2008  financial 
crisis. 
 
A dream came true. 







urope  is  plural.  One  immediately  thinks  of  its  two  main  postwar 
occurrences:  the  European  Union  (EU),  and  the  Economic  and 
Monetary Union (EMU). But there is also the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), the European Economic Area (EEA), and the Europe of Schengen. 
When one considers this plurality, then Europe’s motto seems totally obvious: 
―United in diversity.‖ 
This plurality is at the root of Europe’s successes but also its challenges. In the 
past 60 years, Europe has gone through an unbelievable number  of steps to 
rebuild itself and integrate its economies to become both a new and peaceful 
Europe. From Robert Schuman’s declaration on May 9
th, 1950, to the rejection 
of  the  European  Constitution  on  June  12,  2008
1, Europe is definitely not 
running a sprint, but a hurdle race. It is surely a slower, and more complicated 
process than was anticipated, but Europe continues to progress in its integration. 
From an economically motivated integration, Europe is now closer to the 
supranational entity once dreamt of b y Robert Schuman and presented to the 
world  in  the  ―clock  lounge‖  of  the  Foreign  Affairs  Ministry  Hausmanian 
building. 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
With 23 official languages (including a regional language: Gaelic), 27 countries
2, 
500 million inhabitants, the EU is  the world trading leader. Considered as a 
single economy, the EU generated an estimated nominal gross domestic product 
(GDP) of US$16.83 trillion in 2007, amounting to 31% of the world's total 
                                                 
1  By the Irish people following the French and Dutch peoples. 
2 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 





economic output. It is also the largest exporter of goods, the  second largest 
importer behind the United States and the biggest trading partner to several large 
countries such as India, and China. With 281 medals during the 2008 Summer 
Olympic Games, the EU is ranked first, before the US (second with 110 medals), 
and  China  (third  with  100  medals).  Roughly  170  of  the  top  500  largest 
corporations measured by revenue (Fortune Global 500) have their headquarters 
in  the  EU.  And  Europe  is  definitely  diverse,  which  is  a  challenge  in  many 
regards; there is a great deal of variance for annual per capita income (from 
US$7,000 to US$69,000) within individual EU states. 
The EU was officially established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, on the 
foundations laid down by the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957
3. Essentially, the EU has two main characteristics: one 
economic, and one political. Economically, the EU is a free -trade area (free 
movements of goods, services, capital, and persons) and a customs union. 
Politically, the EU is the layer governed b y specifically-designed institutions to 
manage this free -trade area in its several constituencies: the Council of the 
European Union, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the 
European Court of Justice. The EU is thus a hybrid of inter -governmentalism 
and supra-nationalism. 
THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION 
Aside the EU stands the EFTA. The EFTA was established on May 3, 1960 as a 
trade-bloc alternative for European states who were no yet ready to join the 
then-EEC  (now  the  EU).  Austria,  Denmark,  Norway,  Portugal,  Sweden, 
Switzerland (representing also Liechtenstein) and the United Kingdom were the 
founding members of the EFTA. Finland became a member in 1986 (being an 
associate member since 1961), and Iceland joined in 1970. The United Kingdom 
and Denmark left EFTA in 1973 to join the EEC. Portugal was the next EFTA 
country to join the EEC in 1986. Finally, Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the 
newly created European Union in 1995. In 2009, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, 
and Liechtenstein remain members of EFTA, but the 2008 financial crisis may 
have an impact on their perspectives and future status.  
Created on January 1, 1994, the EEA allows the EFTA countries to participate 
in the European single market without joining the EU. The contracting parties 
                                                 
3 More precisely, the EEC was established by one of the two Treaties of Rome.  
7 
to the EEA Agreement are three of the four EFTA states(Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and  Norway)  and  the  27  EU  Member  States.  The  fourth  EFTA  country 
(Switzerland) is linked to the EU through bilateral agreements. 
THE SCHENGEN RULES 
Covering a population of over 450 million people, the Schengen rules apply to 
25 states, 22 from the European Union states and 3 non-EU members (Iceland, 
Norway and Switzerland). The rules include provisions on common policy on 
the  temporary  entry  of  persons  and  the  harmonization  of  external  border 
controls. Two EU members (the United Kingdom and Ireland) have opted not 
to fully participate in the Schengen system. 
THE EURO 
On top of the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons, sixteen EU 
Member States have introduced the euro as their currency: Belgium, Germany, 
Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Austria, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Finland, and Slovakia (see Figure 1). Upon 
accession to the EU, a new Member State commits itself to introducing the euro 
when  all  the  necessary  criteria  have  been  met.  By  meeting  these  criteria,  a 
Member State demonstrates a high degree of sustainable economic convergence 
with the euro-area economy before introducing the euro. The first countries to 
enter in January 4, 1999 were Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Portugal,  and  Finland.  Then  came 
Greece (January 1, 2001), Slovenia (January 1, 2007), Cyprus (January 1, 2008), 
Malta (January 1, 2008), and Slovakia on January 1, 2009. 
The  path  to  the  membership  of  the  euro  area,  in  other  words  the  path  to 
becoming an optimum currency area
4, or the impact of sharing a single currency 
as  explained  by  the  theo ry  of  an  endogenous  optimum  currency  area
5  
                                                 
4 Kenen, Peter B. 1969. "The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View," in 
Monetary Problems in the International Economy. Robert Mundell and A Swoboda eds. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, McKinnon, Ronald. 1963. "Optimum Currency Areas." The 
American Economic Review, 53, pp. 717-24, Mundell, Robert. 1961. "A Theory of Optimal Currency 
Areas." American Economic Review, 51, pp. 657-65. 
5 Frankel, Jeffrey A and Andrew K Rose. 1998. "The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency 
Area Criteria." Economic Journal, 108, pp. 1009-25, Mundell, Robert. 1973. "Uncommon 
Arguments for common Currencies," in The Economics of Common Currencies. H. G. Johnson and A. 
K. Swoboda eds: Allen and Unwin, pp. 114-32, Warin, Thierry, Phanindra Wunnava, and Hubert  
8 
strengthens the degree of economic interdependence between Member States. 
Euro-area  Member  States  share  the  common  currency  and  lose  their 
autonomous monetary policy to a euro-wide monetary policy conducted by the 
European Central Bank (ECB). This increasing economic integration encourages 
closer coordination of economic policies. 
Figure 1 
Map of Europe  
 
Source: www.europa.eu.int, 2009. 
In  view  of  this  interdependence,  euro-area  members  face  specific,  common 
economic challenges. For this reason, since 1999, the finance ministers of the 
euro-area Member States have met informally as the ―Eurogroup‖ to discuss 
issues  connected  to  their  shared  responsibilities  for  the  single  currency.  The 
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the  President of the 
                                                                                                                               
Janicki. 2009. "Testing Mundell's Intuition of Endogenous OCA Theory." Review of International 
Economics, 17:1, pp. 74-86.  
9 
European Central Bank also participate in these meetings. Lately, in the wake of 
the 2008 financial crisis, the United Kingdom has joined the Eurogroup for a 
special meeting on dealing with the issues at stake. 
This report will highlight some of the big changes the euro area has faced over 
the past ten years. These changes have mostly been successes, but at times they 
have represented the real future challenges of Europe. Before going into this 
discussion, a brief history of European economic integration will be presented. 
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n the aftermath of the Second World War, Europe’s economies were in 
ruin.  After  the  Hague  Convention  of  1948  it  was  also  clear  that  the 
rebuilding of Europe meant not only the recovery of the national economies, but 
also the design of a common European project to prevent further wars. In 1951 
six  countries  (Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  and  The 
Netherlands) signed the Treaty of Paris. This treaty dealt with the integration of 
coal production and one of the most used material: steel. The Coal and Steel 
community was born. The idea of a free-trade area, expanded to other goods and 
services, emerged. Even beyond pure economic considerations, the share of the 
civil  atomic  energy  came  on  the  table,  although  in  1955  the  most  advanced 
country in atomic energy, France, initially refused to transfer its knowledge to 
the other members of the Treaty of Paris club, which included Germany. In 
1957 however, two treaties were signed: the Treaties of Rome. The first treaty 
created  the  Europe  of  energy:  Euratom.  The  second  treaty  gave  birth  to  a 
roadmap envisioning a total free-trade area and a customs union for goods and 
services. This included complete freedom of migration between the members of 
what was then called the European Economic Community (EEC). Because of its 
military and strategic implications, Euratom received a lot of attention. We all 
know now that the second treaty was by far the most consequential one. The 
first integrated policy was the Common Agricultural Policy in 1962. It is the first 
example of the adaptation of the countries to EEC regulation. Instead of having 
tariffs and subsidies decided at the national level, starting in 1962, tariffs between 
the EEC members and national subsidies would disappear, and external tariffs 
would be harmonized. Subsidies and agricultural regulations would be decided at 
the European level based not on the needs of individual countries but on targets 
for certain agricultural products. All of this was designed to prevent competitive 
I 
FIRST PART  
11 
distortions. In 1967, 18 months before the deadline agreed to in the Treaty of 
Rome, the EEC became a real free-trade area. However, with the entrance of 
new members through the 70s and 80s, the need for a new and enlarged free-
trade area was felt, and the single market for goods, services, capital and labor, 
whose roadmap was launched in 1986, was a major step in this direction. It was 
fully implemented in 1993 with the Single European Act. 
In the early 70s, the Werner report added a monetary dimension to the existing 
trade union. The two oil crises that followed prevented this idea from gaining 
real momentum before the late 70s. In July 1978 at Bremen, the Chancellor of 
Germany, Helmut Schmidt, and the French president, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, 
proposed the creation of a ―zone of monetary stability in Europe by establishing 
a  European  Monetary  System.‖  In  the  late  80s,  the  then-president  of  the 
European Commission, Jacques Delors, proposed in a report named after him, 
the political integration of the EEC members with a common currency. The 
international context was the future reunification of Germany and the possible 
collapse of USSR. As early as 1989, the European Commission called attention 
to  the  necessity  of  healthy  public  finances  as  a  precondition  of  monetary 
integration:  ―uncoordinated  and  divergent  national  fiscal  policies  would 
undermine monetary stability and generate imbalances in the real and financial 
sectors of the Community‖
6. In this context, it was thought that the European 
community should move further to prevent the rise again of nationalisms and 
tensions between countries. The criteria for accession to the so-called Economic 
and Monetary Union–a sub-group of the European Union–was laid down in the 
Treaty of Maastricht (February 1992) implemented in 1993. The economic entry 
criteria were designed to ensure economic convergence—they are known as the 
―convergence criteria‖ (or ―Maastricht criteria‖). 
Adopting the single currency is a crucial step in a Member State's economy. Its 
exchange rate is irrevocably fixed and its monetary policy is transferred to the 
hands of the European Central Bank, which conducts it independently for the 
entire euro area.  
In addition to meeting the economic convergence criteria, a euro-area candidate 
country must make changes to national laws and rules and abide by the so-called 
                                                 
6 Delors, Jacques. 1989. Economic and Monetary Union and Relaunching the Construction of Europe. 
Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications of the European Communities. 
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―Acquis communautaires.‖ One obvious rule is to declare national central banks 
independent. 
The  convergence  criteria  are  formally  defined  as  a  set  of  macroeconomic 
indicators, which measure: 
Price stability: no inflation rate should be greater than 1.5% above the average of 
the three countries having the lowest inflation rates. 
Sustainability of public finances: the public deficit should be below 3% of GDP, 
and national debt should be below 60% of GDP. 
Exchange-rate stability: participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) 
for at least two years without strong deviations from the ERM II central rate.  
Long-term convergence: it is measured compared to the long-term interest rate 
average of the three countries with the lowest inflation rates. 
The Member States that initially adopted the euro in 1999 had to meet all these 
conditions. The same entry criteria apply to all countries that have since adopted 
the euro and to all those that will wish to join in the future.  
Of  the  EU  Member  States  outside  the  euro  area,  Denmark  and  the  United 
Kingdom obtained ―opt-out‖ clauses in 1992 during negotiations over the Treaty 
of Maastricht. Sweden is not yet in the euro area for a different reason: it has not 
made  the  necessary  changes  to  its  central  bank  legislation.  This  technicality 
creates a precedent because Sweden, although being required to adopt the euro, 
does not meet the convergence criterion related to participation in the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM II). New EU members could use this precedent to not 











uring the initial convergence period from 1993 to late 1998, it appeared 
that some coordination rules would be needed once the first European 
countries were ready to enter into the EMU. To this end, Germany proposed the 
Stability Pact in order to extend the positive effects of the convergence period, 
and  to  prevent  countries  from  contracting  their  public  spending  during  this 
period, only to increase it later on. 
THE FISCAL POLICY 
First drafted in Madrid in 1995, heavily debated in Florence and Dublin in 1996, 
and accepted by France the same year, the Stability Pact became the Stability and 
Growth  Pact  (SGP).  Now  backed  by  the  two  largest  countries  of  the 
forthcoming EMU, the SGP was adopted in Amsterdam in 1997. 
The discussion led to a twin-track strategy. The first track is based upon Article 
103 of the Maastricht Treaty, under the aegis of strengthening fiscal surveillance 
coordination, whereas the second track is based on article 104c regarding the 
excessive  deficit  procedure.  Article  103  sets  up  an  early  warning  system  for 
identifying and correcting budgetary slippages to ensure that government budget 
deficits will not exceed the ceiling of 3% of GDP. Article 104c consists of a set 
of rules to avoid excessive deficits, or to take measures (including sanctions) to 
correct them quickly if they occur. The SGP consists of extensions of the fiscal 
package of the Treaty of Maastricht. To comply with the SGP countries must 
have a budget deficit within 3% of GDP, or public debt lower than 60% of 
GDP, although recent practice suggests that the latter criterion seems to be of a 
weaker timbre.  
D  
SECOND PART  
14 
There are dissuasive elements, which require Member States to take immediate 
corrective action and, if necessary, allow for the imposition of sanctions
7. If a 
country breaches the SGP, it   exposes itself to penalties. These penalties are 
embodied in the SGP through article 104c of the Treaty of Maastricht via 
compulsory  deposits  that,  after  time,  can  be  transformed  into  fines  if 
governments do not take measures to decrease their deficits. T he non-interest 
bearing deposits are made up of two elements; a fixed sum equal to 0.2% of 
GDP and a supplement of 0.1% of GDP for every percentage point by which 
the budget deficit exceeds the 3% reference level. Derogation is possible for 
―exceptional and temporary‖ circumstances, particularly in the case of a negative 
annual real growth rate. The exemption is automatic for countries if their GDP 
has declined by at least 2%, and if the excess deficit is temporary and small. 
Those countries in which the GDP has declined between 0.75% and 2% can also 
gain  exemption  from  the  rule  with  the  consent  of  the  Council.  In  the  new 
definition of the SGP, ―relevant factors‖ will also be considered. When taking 
into account ―relevant factors‖–which are already in the Treaty and which have 
to be used in a balanced overall assessment–the decision whether an excessive 
deficit exists will be fully conditional on the overarching principle that–before 
these factors are taken into account–the excess over the reference value has to 
be temporary and the deficit has to remain close to the reference value, nor can 
those relevant factors be invoked to put an end to an excessive deficit procedure. 
More emphasis will be placed on debt developments and sustainability. 
Since France and Germany breached the pact, the European Commission was 
bound by the SGP to levy sanctions against them; an interest-free deposit of 
between 0.2% and 0.5% of GDP should have been collected, a situation that 
would have resulted in a fine for Germany and France of €4 billion and €3 
billion, respectively.    
The Franco-German case has reactivated the economics literature on the pros 
and cons of a European fiscal rule. Germany, France, Italy and Britain constitute 
a powerful club arguing for a reform. Defenders of the rule, whose budgets are 
in order, are smaller states such as Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands (see 
Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
                                                 
7 European Council. 1997. "Speeding up and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure." Official Journal, L:209, pp. 0006-11.  
15 
On the other hand, fiscal policy is still decentralized and the responsibility of 
each nation. The European budget is very meagre (1.2% of GDP) compared to 
national budgets. This mixture of centralized monetary policy and decentralized 
budgetary  policies  leads  to  a  difficult  question;  how  to  establish  the  ―right‖ 
policy mix for the euro zone? 
EVOLUTION OF THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT 
On March 23
rd, 2005, the European Council agreed unanimously to introduce 
some  flexibility  into  the  SGP,  creating  in  fact  a  SGP  II.  This  flexibility  is 
introduced  via  the  concept  of  ―relevant  factors‖,  which  are  country  specific. 
Nevertheless, six years of governance by the Treaty of Maastricht, followed by 
five  years  under  the  rules  of  the  SGP  seem  to  adequately  demonstrate  the 
positive  externalities  created  by  the  European  fiscal  packages  on  European 
countries’ economies. 
However,  with  the  financial  crisis  that  started  in  2008  some  countries  are 
breaching, or close to breaching, the SGP in 2009. Using the revised numbers 
from Eurostat for Greece, the latter was always above the 3% deficit ceiling. 
Portugal’s  deficit  in  2001  was  greater  than  3%,  followed  by  Germany's  and 
France's from 2002 to 2004, as well as the subsequent breaches by Italy, U.K., 
and  The  Netherlands  in  2004.  France,  Germany,  the  UK  and  a  significant 
number of other European countries are expected to breach the SGP in 2009 
and  2010.  The  British  public  deficit  may  even  reach  10%  of  GDP  in  2010. 
Although  this  is  technically  possible  within  the  confines  of  the  SGP  rules 
































































































































































































Source: Ameco, 2009.  
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Figure 3 




























































































































































































 Source: Ameco, 2009.  
18 
If the SGP comes to an end as a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis, it will 
pose a big challenge for public finances and also monetary policy. The original 
fears accounted  for in  the earlier economic literature  will  reappear. Europe’s 
public  finances  are  a  bigger  challenge  than  usually  thought.  The  ill-designed 
SGP, the lack of an efficient policy mix, the demographic challenge, and the 
resistance to structural reforms in the European countries are serious challenges 
to the European economic integration. 
SOME  REASONS  WHY  THE  STABILITY  AND  GROWTH  PACT  FACES 
CHALLENGES 
The  question  of  free-riding  is  at  the  forefront  of  this  issue.  The  standard 
explanation goes like this: when a government gets in fiscal trouble, investors 
may sell bonds, whose prices fall and deteriorate the balance sheets of private 
banks. In order to avoid the collapse of the banking system, the ECB may feel 
pressured to buy these bonds and thereby monetize the deficit. The resulting 
inflation tax is borne by citizens of the whole Euro region and not only by those 
of the ―guilty‖ country. This provides a strong incentive for a government to 
carry out riskier fiscal policies than those outside the monetary union: in good 
times, it will reap the full benefit while in bad times costs will be transferred to a 
large extent on the other member countries. Limits on deficits of the SGP type 
have  a  favorable  role  in  deterring  excessive  spending  and  may  serve  as  an 
efficient fiscal coordination device. Also, until mid-March 2008, the ECB statute 
and  the  Maastricht  Treaty  explicitly  forbad  government  bailouts.  This  is  no 
longer true as a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Even if the ECB is not influenced by fiscal policy, legal limits on public deficits 
may be useful. When a country belonging to a monetary union undertakes a 
fiscal expansion favorable to domestic employment, interest rates in the union 
increase and/or the currency appreciates; in this case, activity and employment in 
the  other  member  countries  might  be  adversely  affected  by  this  policy. 
Therefore, all of them bear the cost of self-interested actions. In this context, 
sanctions against deviating countries could prevent self-interested governments 
from carrying out opportunistic policies.  
POLITICAL REALITY 
Any breach of the deficit rule precluded the country’s entrance. In effect, once a 
member of the EMU, a country understands that the letter of the SGP’s law is 
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far looser than its spirit, and that some room for manoeuvring exists. Indeed, its 
application  is  more  difficult  than  the  criteria,  and  the  dynamics  of  the  pact 
generate  unforeseen  effects.  Because  the  SGP  is  calculated  over  GDP  and 
countries cannot know the precise level of the gross domestic product in the 
future,  it  is  almost  impossible  for  countries  to  target  a  deficit  of  3%  GDP. 
Consequently, the SGP is effectively an ex post facto rule.  
This characteristic makes it rather difficult, if not impossible, for a country to 
abide by the rule without knowing precisely what its end of the year GDP will 
be.
8  When a country decides its spending, it approximates its reve nue by 
considering a forecast of the GDP growth rate.  If for any reason the actual 
GDP is lower than the forecasted GDP,
9 the country may breach the pact. While 
it might be argued in defence of the pact that a country should choose a 
minimum margin approach instead of an optimistic one, political considerations 
make  this  improbable.  Given  the  impact  of  economic  language  on  people’s 
confidence, a policymaker may continue to forecast a higher GDP growth rate, 
and consider an actual deficit cap lower than the 3% rule. Politicians, however, 
for whom the life cycle is very short, may consider the vagueness of such an 
approach to be a loophole. This intrinsic ex post facto feature of the SGP is an 
important reason why the political incentive to abide by the pact is reduced. 
THE MONETARY POLICY 
With the launch of the single currency as of January 1999, the European Union 
has reached a new and outstanding stage of its economic integration. At this 
time,  the  eleven  founding  euro  countries  transferred  control  over  monetary 
policy to the ECB and assigned to this new supranational institution the goal of 
price stability in the euro region. As stipulated in the statutes of the ECB
10, its 
primary mandate is to ensure price stability (see  Figure 4). At the same time, 
instead of seeing diverging inflation rates as a consequence of differences in 
growth, inflation rates converged (see Figure 5).  
 
                                                 
8 For instance, France in 2002 breached the SGP with a deficit of 3.1% of GDP. 
9 See Jonung, Lars and Martin Larch. 2004. "Improving Fiscal Policy in the EU: The Case for 
Independent Forecasts." European Economy Economic Papers, 210. 
10 European Central Bank. 1992. "Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank." C191/68: 12. European Union: Brussels.  
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Figure 4 
Harmonized consumer price index (% change) 
 
Source: Ameco, 2009. 
 
Figure 5 
 Inflation dispersion for euro-area member states  
 
Source: Own computations, 2009.  
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The strong emphasis on price stability finds its rationale in two arguments: (1) a 
political  argument:  the  ECB  must  look  like  the  Bundesbank  to  reassure  the 
Germans; (2) an economic argument: the search for credibility
11. 
The latter has actually worked. Although a wide variety of national debt levels 
exists across the euro area, which would justify a higher risk -premium for the 
highly indebted countries (Belgium, Greece, Italy), in fact treasury bonds spreads 
narrowed as if the financial markets did not consider these countries to be at risk 
of default anymore (see  Figure  6). This is even more interesting when one 
remembers that the Treaty of Maastricht forbids country bailouts, as well as it 
forbids the ECB from bailing out countries in difficulty. 
Figure 6 
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11 Barro, Robert and David Gordon. 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of 
Monetary Policy." Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, pp. 101-22, Kydland, Fynn and Edward 
Prescott. 1977. "Rules Rather than Discretion, The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans." Journal of 
Political Economy, 85:3, pp. 473-92, Rogoff, Kenneth. 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment 
























































































Germany Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland  
Source: Ameco, 2009. 
 
Moreover, when one looks at the difference in the ECB minimum bid rate and 
the  US  federal  funds  target  rate  (see  Figure  7),  there  was  no  real  reason  to 
believe that the euro would appreciate, but it did. This is the result of both an 
improvement in the euro area’s fundamentals, and a higher credibility. 
Figure 7 
Central bank policy rates  
 
Source: (European Commission 2007).  
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If this search for price stability has ensured the credibility of the ECB, criticisms 
arose in 2008 and 2009 concerning the blindness of the ECB in coming to the 
assistance of Europe’s economies. The basic argument is that the Fed is better 
equipped to cope with the financial crisis than the ECB. Even if the ECB’s 
mandate may seem more favorable to a sound monetary policy, the question is 
whether  the  ECB  can  ignore  the  secondary  objective  of  the  Fed;  the  real 
economy. The search for credibility may explain this institutional blindness. And 
it does have consequences on the European economies. Just between January 
2006 and April 2007 (see Figure 8), the euro appreciated against almost all other 
currencies, profoundly affecting the trade competitiveness of the euro area. 
Figure 8 
Changes in EUR bilateral rates (January 2006 -Mid-April 2007).
12 
 Source: European Commission (2007) Own computations, 2009. 
SOME REASONS WHY THE MONETARY POLICY FACES CHALLENGES 
When  the  treaty  was  initially  drafted,  many  economists  felt  that  loose  fiscal 
policies would harm the credibility of the European Central Bank which, despite 
formal interdiction, might be compelled to bail out spendthrift governments, 
thus  fuelling  inflation  and  harming  the  Euro  stability.  Some  of  them  also 
emphasized the risk that, once in the monetary union, certain countries might 
                                                 
12 USD=U.S. Dollar; JPY=Japanese Yen; GBP=British Pound; CHF=Swiss Franc; 
SEK=Swedish Crown; CNY=Chinese Renminbi.  
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borrow  excessively  as  they  will  have  access  to  the  wider  pool  of  European 
savings
13.  
Beyond the question of harming the credibility of the ECB through the risk of 
having countries free-ride on their fiscal policies, there is the question of finding 
the correct mix between the centralized monetary policy and the decentralized—
though  cooperating—national  fiscal  policies.  European  authorities  have  long 
been concerned with this question. Even in 1989, the European Commission 
paid great attention to the necessity for sound public finances as a condition of 
monetary integration, as, ―uncoordinated and divergent national fiscal policies 
would  undermine  monetary stability  and generate imbalances in  the  real and 
financial sectors of the Community‖ (Delors, 1989).  
Aside from the policy mix question, when the Maastricht Treaty was drafted 
many officials felt that the fiscal setup would undermine the credibility of the 
European Central Bank. If a country's fiscal situation becomes unsustainable, 
other countries might be forced to bail out the insolvent national government, or 
the European Central Bank might be forced to monetize unsustainable national 
debts, and in doing  so, create additional inflation in the EU
14. The SGP would 
save the credibility of the ECB while ensuring the latter a good policy mix as the 
countries are constrained by the fiscal rule.  
THE STRUCTURAL POLICY 
By adopting the euro, the economies of the euro-area members became more 
integrated  (see  Figure  9).  Apart  from  Ireland  in  2008,  the  euro-12  countries 
converged to around 5% nominal growth. This economic integration must be 
managed properly to realize the full benefits of the single currency. Therefore, 
the euro area is also distinguished from other parts of the EU by its economic 
management–in particular, economic policy-making. 
                                                 
13 Goodhart, Charles. 1992. "EMU in Europe: A UK Perspective," in Exchange Rate Regimes and 
Currency Unions. Ernst Baltensperger and Hans Werner Sinn ed. New-York: St Martin's Press, pp. 
1983-2199. 
14 Beetsma, Roel and A. Lans Bovenberg. 1995. "The Interaction of Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
in a Monetary Union: Balancing Credibility and Flexibility." Working Papers Tilburg Center for 
Economic Research:95101.  
25 
Figure 9 
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Source: European Commission (2007). 
Since the euro area members cannot use the monetary policy and have strict 
medium term fiscal objectives restraining them from running the fiscal policy of 
their choice, they have three remaining tools to design economic policies: (1) the 
law (regulations/deregulations), (2) taxation policy, and (3) public expenditure 
allocation. The goal of the structural policy is to tackle unemployment, labor 
conditions, and inequalities. Although it declined to a euro area average of 7.5% 
of the labor force (see Figure 10), unemployment is an issue for the euro-area 
members. It actually stagnated at around 8% in the early 2000s. In light of the 
2008 financial crisis, this number can only rise (see Figure 10, years 2009 and 
2010), meaning that if the answer comes neither from the ECB nor from the 
fiscal  policy,  then    structural  policies—coordinated  or  not  at  the  Eurogroup 
level—will be of a paramount importance.  
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Figure 10 























































































Unemployment rate employment (% change)
 
Source: Ameco. 2009. 
Another challenge the euro area faces is that of labor productivity. Although the 
euro area is a very productive region when levels are considered, the growth rate 
in labor productivity has declined (see Figure 11). 
Figure 11 
















































































adjusted wage share (% change)
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labor productivity (% change)
 Source: Ameco, own computations, 2009.  
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Wage growth however was contained: the compensation per employee and the 
percentage change in the adjusted wage share provide evidence that the euro-
area gained in competitiveness (see Figure 11).   
About R&D, with an average of 1.2% of GDP invested in R&D, the euro area is 
below the  U.S.  (1.9%),  and Japan (2.4%).  This explains the  lower return on 
innovation—except for Luxembourg, Germany and Finland (see Figure 12). 
Figure 12 
R&D spending and innovation levels.  
 
Source: European Commission (2007). 
The challenge is that economic policy remains largely the responsibility of the 
Member  States,  but  national  governments  must  coordinate  their  respective 
economic policies in order to attain the common objectives of stability, growth 
and employment. Coordination is achieved through a number of structures and 
instruments. 
First of all, every topic that is now of exclusive competency of the EU, such as 
trade policy or the common market, is discussed at the EU level, not at the 
national level. 
Second of all, the Eurogroup was created in 1997 and represents an ―informal 
institutionalization‖ of the euro-area members. Economic policies are debated 
and coordinated (at best) on a monthly basis. If coordination does not happen, 
at least every country knows what its peers are going to decide.  
28 
Third  of  all,  European  Union  leaders  have  reached  an  agreement  on  a  new 
Constitutional Treaty for Europe at the European Council in Brussels on June 
17 and 18, 2004. Interestingly enough, the SGP is included in the Constitution, 
thus it has been reaffirmed even after having been criticized. The Heads of State 
or  Government  reaffirmed:  ―With  regard  to  Article  III-76,  the  Conference 
confirms that raising growth potential and securing sound budgetary positions 
are  the  two  pillars  of  the  economic  and  fiscal  policy  of  the  Union  and  the 
Member  States.  The  SGP  is  an  important  tool  to  achieve  these  goals.  The 
Conference reaffirms its commitment to the provisions concerning the Stability 
and Growth Pact as the framework for the coordination of budgetary policies in 
the Member States of the European Union.‖
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 The external dimension of the euro 
 
he size, stability and strength of the euro-area economy make the euro 
increasingly attractive beyond its borders. On the 4
th of January 1999 
when the fundamentals of European economies look similar as the day before 
(on the financial calendar, it was December 30
th, 1998), the euro was already 
more used in international markets than the former currencies of Europe. This 
suggests that financial markets thought the credibility of the whole was greater 
than the credibility of the parts themselves. However, from 1999 to mid-2001, 
the euro fell to a historic low point at around US$ 0.83, but then steadily rose 
until a historical high at almost US$ 1.6, to be around US$ 1.35 early 2009. Ten 
years later, the euro is now stronger than at its birth, although it is in the early 
2009 in the midst of the worst financial crises since 1929 (see Figure 13). 
Figure 13 
Euro-Dollar exchange rate (Jan 4, 1999-Feb 3, 2009)  
 
Source: ECB 
The  widespread  use  of  the  euro  in  the  international  financial  and  monetary 
system demonstrates its global presence
16. The international use of a currency 
can be defined through the usual taxonomy: a unit of account, a medium of 
exchange, and a store of value. 
T 
THIRD PART 
This suggests that 
financial markets 
thought the 
credibility of the 
whole was greater 
than the credibility 
of the parts 
themselves.  
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In terms of a proxy for being a unit of account and a medium of exchange, one 
can think of the euro’s share as a settlement/invoicing currency in extra-euro 
area  trade  with  euro  area  countries.  It  is  worth  noticing  the  rise  for  all  the 
countries in the use of the euro in international trade (see Figure 14). The euro is 
the second most actively traded currency in foreign exchange markets; it is a 
counterpart in around 40% of the daily transactions.  
Figure 14 
Euro's share as a settlement/invoicing currency in extra-euro area exports  
and imports of goods and services of selected euro area countries  
 
Source:  European Central Bank (2008). 
In  terms  of  being  a  store  of  value,  the  portfolio  investment  assets  in  debt 
securities (see Figure 15) and the currency shares in foreign exchange reserves 
(see Figure 16) may both serve as proxies. It is interesting to notice that portfolio 
investment assets in debt securities are very influenced by the region. The euro 
                                                                                                                               
16 European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs. 2009. "The euro in the world." 
European Commission: Brussels.  
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has definitely a real attraction on the non-euro area EU members, but also plays 
a role in the diversification of assets for the U.S. and Asia (see Figure 15). 
Figure 15 
Currency breakdown of portfolio investment assets held  
in debt securities at the end of 2006  
 
Source: European Central Bank (2008) 
In terms of foreign exchange reserves, the U.S. dollar has faced an uninterrupted 
decline from 71% in 1999 to 63.9% in 2007, when the euro rose from 17.9% to 
26.5%  during  the  same  time  span  (see  Figure  16).  Developing  countries  are 
among those which have increased their reserves in euro the most, from 18% in 
1999  to  around  30%  in  2006.  The  euro  is  the  second  most  important 
international currency behind the US dollar.  
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Figure 16 
Currency shares in foreign exchange reserves with  
disclosed currency composition at current exchange rates since 1999 
 
Source:  European Central Bank (2008) 
The  euro  is  increasingly  used  to  issue  government  and  corporate  debt 
worldwide.  At  the  end  of  2007,  the  share  of  the  euro  in  international  debt 
markets was around one-third, while the US dollar accounted for 43.6% (see 
Figure 17). 
Figure 17 
 Currency shares in gross issuance of international debt securities, breakdown by maturity 
 
Source: European Central Bank (2008)  
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The Next 10 Years:  
The EMU through the Financial Crisis 
 
 
he past ten years have been an incredible success for the euro. Relying 
on the foundations of the ECU, the euro is managed by a brand new 
central bank. The big and only challenge for the ECB in 1999 was to create and 
convince financial markets of its high reputation. In other words, the ECB had 
to be trustworthy. This challenge has been tackled with success. Every single 
country of the euro has benefited from this success. As mentioned, the interest 
on treasury bonds declined, and the spreads were never this low compared to 
Germany. In other words, countries with a higher risk premium before the euro 
were able to finance their deficits and then refinance their debts at a lower price 
(almost the same price as Germany). Not only does this help in lowering their 
debts, but it improves the quality of the debt. 
In 2009, amidst the worst financial crisis since 1929, the ECB no longer has to 
worry about its credibility. And this is particularly true in an open world where 
the Fed injects liquidity almost for free, and where inflation does not seem to be 
the primary issue. Indeed, in a time of crisis, expectations are different. The 
question  is  no  longer  to  find  sound  and  inexpensive  financing,  it  is  to  find 
financing. If the ECB does not change its priorities, the financial markets will 
come to believe that the only response to the crisis will come from fiscal and 
structural  policy.  In  this  context,  one  can  expect  that  countries  with  higher 
deficits in normal times will now need to run even higher deficits. The question 
is to find liquidity: in a liquidity scarce world, these countries will pay more. 
Therefore, we can expect to see financial markets placing a higher risk premium 
on these countries for two reasons: (1) they may be short of liquidity as they are 
facing a higher risk of defaulting, and (2) since the SGP is no longer an effective 
control over public deficits (see Figure 18), nobody knows how big deficits will 
be, meaning that there is no longer any reason to not put a higher risk premium 






General gross balance and gross debt for the euro area.  
 
Source: European Commission (2007) 
Most of the next ten years will be constituted by challenges. Simulations for 
growth in 2009 and 2010 rely on various assumptions (see Figure 19). A lot of 
the  answers  depend  upon  which  scenario  will  be  chosen  to  rely  upon  what 
combination of monetary, fiscal and structural policies will be used. 
Figure 19 
Growth forecasts for the euro are  
 
Source:  European Commission (2007)  
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Broadly  speaking,  if  monetary  policy  cannot  be  used  as  an  answer—even 
partial—to guide Europe through the crisis, governments have no choice but to 
use their fiscal policies. This will have a snowball effect: not only will treasury 
bond interest rise due to the liquidity scarcity, but it will also rise because the 
fiscal discipline created by the SGP and the indirect policy-mix benefit associated 
with the SGP will no longer exist. Financial markets will demand a higher risk 
premium. Governments can also fall back on structural policies, but in tough 
times where unemployment is on the rise accompanied with social tensions, it is 
unlikely that governments will implement policies positively impacting Europe’s 
competitiveness (lowering labor costs, etc.). Can this threaten the euro? Is it 
plausible that countries leave the euro? The answer is no. The euro still offers a 
protection in the form of a lower risk premium on debt. If countries were to 
leave, they would face a rise in their risk premium and would have an even 
tougher time at financing their deficits. It is in fact more plausible that some 
countries will join the euro, than the converse. Denmark? The United Kingdom? 
This is now possible. A likely scenario is a change in the ECB’s monetary policy, 
or the emergence of a real coordination mechanism among fiscal policies instead 
of the ―cooperation‖ mechanism embodied in the SGP, and maybe even a real 
economic government for the euro area based on the foundations laid down by 
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